ＡＥＩという団体は、保守系のシンクタンク。
そのサイトのecnomic outlookというコーナーのコラムを、昔経済翻訳塾で課題として読んだことがあった。
最近、アメリカ経済が、どうなるのかな、と思っている人も多いと思う。
民主党と、共和党の対立で、債務上限の引き上げができないため、政府機関が一部閉鎖されるとも言われている。
最新のAEIのコラムを見てみた。
The Limits of Monetary and Fiscal Policy
コラムニストは、Makinという人物。
英文は、論理的に構成されているので、結論は最後に書いてある。
このコラムの場合、ポイントは、最初のところに要約されている。
2回の景気刺激策で、金融・財政刺激策も、経済成長および失業率に対して、長期的効果がないと判明した。
2008年以降、これらの刺激策は、アメリカの経済成長率および雇用にほとんど効果がなかったことからわかるのは、3度目の景気刺激策を2011年に実行すれば、2012年にインフレとなり、政府債務比率が上昇するだけだ。
Following two rounds of monetary and fiscal stimulus, we are relearning that neither monetary nor fiscal policy is likely to have long-lasting effects on growth or unemployment. The tepid growth of US output and employment in response to two rounds of monetary and fiscal stimulus since 2008 suggests that a third round of either monetary or fiscal stimulus in 2011 would lead primarily to higher inflation and a higher ratio of government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012.
Key points in this Outlook:
金融政策は限界に来ている。
昨年の数量的緩和によるデフレリスクは過ぎ去り、インフレとなっているため、金融刺激策は選択不可能だ。
* Monetary policy has reached its limits. The significant risk of deflation that prompted last year’s second round of quantitative easing has passed, and with inflation rising, monetary stimulus is no longer an option.
二度の財政刺激策で、持続的な経済成長とはならなかったし、失業率も下がらなかった。
* Two rounds of fiscal stimulus have produced neither a sustained rise in growth nor a sustained drop in the unemployment rate. Another round would merely increase deficits and debt levels.
さらに景気刺激策を実行するより、連銀（FED)は、インフレ率低下を目指すべきだ。議会と大統領は、歳出削減すべきであり、歳出をカットして、税収低下にファイナンスして、対GDPの債務比率を下げるべきだ。
* Rather than enacting further stimulus, the Federal Reserve should aim for lower, steadier inflation, and Congress and the president should cut spending and reduce tax expenditures to finance lower tax rates and reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio.US growth slowed during the first half of 2011 while the sovereign-debt crisis ebbed and flowed and unsettled financial markets, just as occurred in the second quarter of 2010. It is no surprise under these circumstances that the Fed has been under pressure to initiate another round of quantitative easing or that the White House, former Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers, former chair of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers Laura Tyson, and former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Blinder have suggested the need for another fiscal stimulus package. While rising core inflation has appropriately engendered hesitancy on a third round of quantitative easing, rising federal debt has–also appropriately–done the same for fiscal stimulus. If stock markets fall again or unemployment rises further or even stays the same, expect calls for more stimulus to grow louder.
最後の結論の段落。
Reaching the Limits
The painful truth is that the “best” part of fiscal stimulus comes right after it occurs. The worst part comes when it wears off, and debt accumulation precludes further stimulus by threatening government insolvency. The same is true of monetary policy when, after a boost that may induce more hiring when prices rise faster than wages, monetary policy has to be moved back to neutral or tightened before inflation expectations become unanchored.
The painful truth is that the “best” part of fiscal stimulus comes right after it occurs. The same is true of monetary policy.While fiscal consolidation is never easy, the “best” part of the consolidation arrives only after spending is cut and growth slows then starts to rise again as the prospects for solvency improve and expected future tax increases fall. Further, the timing of the arrival of the eventually positive effects of fiscal consolidation is highly uncertain, and it may exceed the patience of lawmakers and the electorate.
There remain many empirical and theoretical controversies surrounding the use of countercyclical monetary and fiscal policy. Most economists would probably agree that, except in a severe financial crisis, like the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis, monetary policy should be directed primarily at maintaining a low, stable inflation rate. Trying to stimulate growth while reducing unemployment with monetary policy only works temporarily, if at all. It risks higher inflation, which will ultimately have to be controlled by sharp monetary tightening and attendant lower growth and higher unemployment, such as occurred after 1979. The same painful truth is tied to fiscal policy, with debt accumulation playing the role that inflation plays with monetary policy as a signal that the limits of expansionary policy have been reached.
There is little evidence to suggest that either monetary or fiscal policy can produce sustained effects on the level of growth or unemployment over time. A possible exception is the stabilization of the growth paths of such variables, such as occurred during the 1985-2007 Great Moderation when lower volatility of growth and inflation may have enhanced productivity growth and allowed for a downward drift in the natural rate of unemployment. But even these suggestions are highly controversial.
The tepid and weakening response of the growth of US output and employment to two rounds of monetary and fiscal stimulus since 2008 suggests that a third round of either monetary or fiscal stimulus in 2011 would lead primarily to higher inflation and a higher ratio of government debt to GDP in 2012. The Fed would do better to aim for lower and steadier inflation, while Congress and the president should cut spending and reduce tax expenditures to finance lower tax rates and achieve a stable and then lower debt-to-GDP ratio.
要するに、景気刺激策は、GDPに対する国債発行比率を引き上げて、インフレにつながるだけだから、歳出削減しろと。
同じことを何度も言ってますね。
